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STUDIES 
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Successful companies in main-line industries are integrating information technology (IT) into almost every 
aspect of their business. This includes using IT to develop, implement, and support business strategies. Because 
of the way IT is being used, these firms typically develop most of their IT in-house (or, in Japan, in coopera-
tion with closely related providers), although (at least in the US) there is recognition of a role for "off-the-
shelf" components and outsourcing. On November 10, 2000, the Center on Japanese Economy and 
Business, Columbia University, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation held a one-day conference to discuss how 
three leading firms—Merck, Citibank, and Toyota—are using IT, and how it relates to their overall business 
strategies. Each panel included a representative of the company and a scholar from the Sloan center that 
studies the firm's industry. A panel of distinguished academics then explored the broader issues of IT's effect on 
competitiveness and industrial s tructure . Excerpts of the presentations are presented below, along with high-
lights of the intra-panel and audience discussions. 
Hugh Patrick 
Under the leadership of Bill 
Rapp, the CJEB has been 
involved in a major project 
analyzing how IT is becoming a 
strategic tool for successful 
companies in main-line indus-
tries. This conference presents 
some of the results. 
In earlier work, Rapp, to his 
surprise, concluded that the 
Japanese software industry as an 
industry was never going to 
become a direct international 
competitor. Rather, it has 
specialized in customized soft-
ware, which frequently is tied to 
specific computer hardware for 
large Japanese companies. (See 
the 1996 Center on Japanese 
Economy and Business confer-
ence report "Software as a Tool 
of Competitive Advantage: A 
US Comparison".) 
That lead to this project to 
compare selected successful 
Japanese and US firms in a 
number of different industries 
in terms of their use of software 
as a strategic input. Funding for 
the project has been provided by 
a grant from the Alfred P Sloan 
Foundation. Besides the direct 
support, the Sloan Foundation 
has supported industry-specific 
study centers at various universi-
ties that have provided material 
for the project. 
PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY 
FRANK LICHTENBERG (CHAIR) 
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William Rapp 
The overwhelming choice of 
a pharmaceutical company using 
IT to improve the way it 
competes was Merck. It was 
largely from the study of Merck 
that a hypothesis, which I call 
"control production", emerged. 
(I think others call it "end-to-
end IT management".) Basically, 
it is the concept of using infor-
mation technology to control all 
parts and processes associated 
with a business, including 
suppliers, customers, and those 
providing after-sales service. 
The pharmaceutical industry 
is heavily regulated, including 
pricing in many countries. An 
aging population creates both 
demand and pressure to contain 
health-care costs. 
The industry probably uses 
IT most extensively in discovery 
R&D. Developing a new drug is 
expensive—the current numbers 
are $350-500 million. To recap-
ture such costs, the drug must 
sell on a global basis, 
To get a drug approved 
requires extensive clinical trials 
which accounted for 70-80% of 
the $350-500 million cost of 
introducing a drug in the late 
1990s. It also is essential to have 
after-sales data, in part because 
of the risks associated with 
multiple drug use by patients, 
especially many seniors. All this 
leads to a tremendous emphasis 
on IT. 
A specific technological 
factor is called "rational drug 
design"—essentially, using 
computers to design drugs. This 
relates to combinatorial chem-
istry, the combining of various 
molecules to achieve certain 
results based on data on how 
particular molecules or similar 
molecules have operated on 
other patients. 
Then there is the "drug 
pipeline"—simplistically, a 
listing of drugs at their various 
stages of development, approval, 
and sales life. Revenue from 
drugs already being sold finances 
the R&D that keeps the pipe 
full and flowing. It is thus 
important to gather and organize 
data on the pipeline as efficiently 
and usefully as possible. 
Charles, Popper 
My remarks focus on the 
techniques aligning IT with 
business strategy. Because of my 
work experience, I bring some-
thing of a technical bias to what 
I say. 
Case studies suggest that the 
business strategy comes first, 
then IT is used to support the 
strategy and amplify it and build 
on opportunities. Every business 
strategy today that I can think 
of requires processing a lot of 
information to support the 
strategy. That said, there are 
situations where IT can drive 
strategy. An example is in basic 
research in pharmaceuticals. 
A transformation is 
underway of what has been a 
"wet science'' into a 'dry 
science". Wet science is "real" 
chemistry: chemists and biolo-
gists sitting at a bench with 
molecules and assays doing 
traditional science experiments. 
Dry science relates to the 
computational analog of this. 
I see the fundamentals of the 
pharmaceutical industry shifting 
from mass production of a 
medicine that services millions 
of patients to being more fine-
tuned and thus more customer 
focused and specific. As an 
example, there are very subtle 
differences in individual toler-
ance to particular drugs. 
Currently, general dosage levels 
are set based on trials. Fine 
tuning means predicting what 
types of people will benefit from 
variations of the molecule, 
thereby avoiding adverse reac-
tions. The result will be a family 
of medicines that can be 
targeted based on genetic 
markers. How quickly this will 
happen is unclear. But clearly 
this is an area where IT is 
driving strategy. 
In pharmaceutical benefit 
management (PBM), the orig-
inal strategy was to get the 
lowest cost for the pharmaceu¬ 
tical components of health care, 
primarily through volume 
buying. After Merck acquired 
MedCo, a leading PBM 
company, in November 1993, 
MedCo started looking at the 
total cost of health care. Often, 
by using the right medicines — 
even if they cost more than 
alternatives — hospitalization 
and other serious effects can 
be avoided, thereby reducing 
total cost. 
Getting the company 
involved with IT is important, 
and if you do not understand 
how to measure qualitatively 
what IT is doing for you, you 
will never be able to improve 
quality in a systematic way. The 
first level is IT literacy, simply 
an understanding by the execu-
tives of what IT means, and 
what their choices are. The next 
level is when executives are 
willing to discuss IT in terms of 
what to do to be on the leading 
edge. This is IT fluency. 
The strategic plan we did for 
Merck Basic Research in the late 
1 990s involved asking the lead-
ership of the laboratories if they 
wanted the IT to be bleeding 
edge, leading edge, or trailing 
edge, and we explained the 
differences. They all said that 
for research they would have to 
be bleeding edge because of the 
transformation of wet science to 
dry science. That required every 
possible advance in IT that we 
could apply. For clinical trials, 
they needed really good tech-
nology, but not something that 
might fail, which means being 
jus t b e h i n d the l ead ing edge 
For the administrative and other 
systems, they wanted the oldest 
and most reliable stuff. 
How applications are imple-
mented, deployed, and operated 
so as to have maximum benefi-
cial impact on the company is a 
key issue. Delivering what you 
have promised on time, on 
budget, and working reliably is 
very difficult. There is a lot of 
variation here, and some compa-
nies are correct in trying to 
outsource. However, I believe 
that, especially at the scale of 
pharmaceutical companies, you 
can afford to do it inhouse. And 
if you do, you will do it better. 
In essence, Merck is a knowl-
edge company, focused on 
breaking new ground. This 
requires smart people with 
access to all the possible infor-
mation that has been developed. 
IT systems can create knowledge 
and help to make it available. 
The general question is how to 
leverage knowledge effectively, 
and this is a way of thinking 
about IT that is an alternative to 
the concept of controlled 
production, although it may 




in any industry need to keep in 
mind the differences in context. 
For pharmaceuticals, these are 
the health care delivery and 
financing environment. Thus, 
because the Japanese govern-
ment allows higher prices for 
"new" drugs, many are intro-
duced each year, but almost all 
of them are variations of existing 
drugs rather than real innova-
tions. Japanese doctors finan-
cially benefit from writing 
prescriptions, and that helps 
explain why per-capita spending 
on drugs is higher in Japan than 
in the US. 
One sees opportunities to 
out-source clinical development, 
clinical trials, regulatory applica-
tions, and manufacturing. An 
interesting question is the extent 
to which companies will 
specialize in just some of these 
functions. Many small biotech 
companies have become very 
excellent research boutiques, and 
there is talk they might be able 
to develop a drug with substan-
tially fewer resources than inte-
grated companies do, but I have 
not seen compelling evidence of 
this. 
DISCUSSION 
Q : How do you integrate 
purchased or newly developed 
in-house IT into the existing 
system? 
Popper: I'm not sure there is 
any magic, just very rigorous 
testing. The key is making sure 
you understand how the new 
system works and the theory 
behind it—in Merck's case, this 
includes the scientific aspects of 
what it is supposed to do. 
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(on behalf of Citibank's 
Alan Young, who was 
unable to attend) 
Citigroup has been using IT 
to improve how it does business. 
Let me give you some examples. 
Ci t ibank recognises that 
there will always be a need for a 
human interface. But call 
centers are expensive, as much 
as $300 million. So ways are 
found to save that interface for 
when it is really needed. Thus, 
an analysis of calls in Europe 
found concentrations around 
times when people wanted to 
know if their paychecks had 
been deposited. There could be 
five or six calls in a day from the 
same person. A system was 
developed to send a message to 
a customer's mobile phone 
confirming deposit, and some 
7 0 % of potential customers 
signed on. As a result, Citibank 
was able to avoid putting in a 
new call center. This illustrates 
why Citi sees a major role for 
mobile phones, greater even 
than for ATMs, although Citi is 
involved with them as well. 
As another example, the 
customer sales rep (CSR) at a 
call center can almost instanta-
neously bring up the entire rela-
tionship with Citigroup, 
including banking, insurance, 
and brokerage. So, to make a 
change, such as address, one call 
does it for all Citi accounts. 
Not only does it irritate a 
caller to be passed to someone 
else, it is very expensive 
because, if the hand-off does 
not work, the customer calls 
back Better to solve the 
problem at the beginning. 
Customer needs change with 
age and circumstances . This is 
captured in Citi's life-cycle 
model that leads to what is 
called a tailored facility, unique 
to an individual but entirely 
generic as to components. This 
is very IT-intensive. 
Citibank generally does not 
outsource IT, and this has been 
true historically. 
In fact, it got into trouble in 
the 1970s and '80s trying to 
develop products that other 
banks were unwilling to go 
along with. But since then it 
has achieved an effective 
balance between innovation and 
the industry's technological 
path, especially within the 
Citicorp Group. 
Pe ter Burns 
There has been a lot of 
consolidation in banking. At 
first this was explained as being 
about economics of scale, but 
research has found little 
supporting evidence. I feel only 
some capital-intensive functions, 
such as clearing, possess them. 
The next explanation was 
economies, or scope. As a first 
pass, this means having many 
different activities and products, 
then cross-selling. Again, 
research and analysis leads to 
skepticism. Cross-selling is not 
easy. It requires collecting infor-
mation about customers, then 
doing something with it. 
Citibank reports that 3-5% of 
global revenue comes from cross-
selling. For a large bank, that is a 
large amount, but it is a long 
way from being meaningful. 
The nature of strategy is 
changing. I think this is in large 
part driven by technology. 
When I was running a strategic 
planning function at a bank, it 
was about creating sustainable 
competitive advantage. You 
looked at your strength and 
weaknesses, and examined 
markets looking for places you 
fit. That worked in a static envi-
ronment, which for many years 
fairly characterized banking. Of 
course there was episodic-
change, such as the debt crisis in 
the late '80s. Things were 
smooth, a bump was hit, a lot 
of things changed, then 
plateaued again. Now, there is 
much evidence that what we are 
dealing with is an environment 
of continual change. This means 
there is "strategic risk". 
One response relates to 
option theory. That is, thinking 
about investments or actions 
that allow participation in some 
future state. You think about the 
possibilities in such a way that 
you can measure the opportu-
nity cost of taking that option. 
This also involves thinking 
about residual values and how 
the option is closed, that is, an 
exit strategy. This is very 
different from what banks have 
done. Banks are notorious for 
investing in all kinds of things, 
which then continue for genera-
tions. Now, you want to do 
things that maximize the oppor-
tunities, and be smart enough to 
know when to quit. 
Citibank has invested in two 
quite independent Internet 
ventures in the United States. 
One is Direct Access, which is 
tied to their banking product. 
The other was a more stand-
alone operation. Citi ran on 
these parallel paths for some 
time, and now have announced 
an integration of the two, along 
with a brokerage piece. In effect, 
Citi made bets on—optioned— 
different states of the world, 
spent some time observing, took 
what was learned, and moved 
on the next solution, which is a 
mix of its two options. 
Banks have been very effec-
tive implementing IT in envi-
ronments where things are 
reasonably predictable. They are 
less successful in areas where 
there is more uncertainty. This 
includes uncertainty regarding 
future states and uncertainty 
because of organizational 
complications. The latter 
involves things that cross busi-
ness lines, so its hard to deter-
mine what the objectives of the 
technology are, and who will 
benefit. However, these deci-
sions are the most important to 
the future competitiveness of 
the institutions. 
This is an argument for new 
metrics—new analytic 
methods—for evaluating deci-
sions, before and after they are 
made . M a n y oppor tuni t ies had 
been missed because of reliance 
on a net present value type of 
analysis. The bigger question 
for the firm is "What is this 
project really going to do?" 
Some of that is intangible. 
Dealing with the intangibles has 
led to winks and nods and 
saying "we know these numbers 
really don't mean anything". 
DlSUCUSSION 
P o p p e r : What is the potential 
role of the startups offering 
technology in niche areas? 
Burns: Citibank views itself as 
being way ahead of the smaller 
companies, particularly since the 
bank is integrating everything it 
does. There have been promi-
nent examples where Citibank 
was unwilling to take on certain 
new technologies. It wants to be 
assured of essentially 100% 
security before it moves into a 
new technological area. That is a 
problem for many startups, 
because they do not understand 
the importance of security and 
account access. 
R a p p : A major challenge for 
Citi is resolving credit card 
problems for its 100 million 
card accounts. This is one 
reason Citibank is interested in 
tying-in with convenience 
stores. If everything is done at 
the score, including delivery, the 
consumer can refuse the 
merchandise or the service at 
that point and there will never 
be a charge to the credit card. 
So a future dispute is avoided. 
The money that can be saved in 
this way is very significant. 
M a g i l a v y : Toyota North 
America spends $3.6 billion 
dollars a year in very small 
transactions—under $100,000 
each. There does not seem to be 
a bank that can support that 
volume of transactions as effi-
ciently as Toyota would like. 
There is a big opportunity here, 
and Citi is starting to look it. 
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William Rapp 
The impact of IT on the 
auto industry has truly been 
dramatic, not only in the way 
cars are produced, but also in 
the way we drive them. 
Large global groupings are 
emerging, and they will be using 
IT extensively both in managing 
operations and in the car. Japan 
10 years ago had 11 independent 
automobile companies, now it 
has 2. At the same time, world-
wide, there is more competition. 
Still, one company remains 
the benchmark, Toyota. Toyota's 
approach to IT is multidimen-
sional, covering design, quality, 
and manufacturability, as well as 
ecommerce and conventional 
administrative uses. 
Kay Magilavy 
Toyota Motor North 
America is the holding company 
for the two largest affiliates 
within North America, Toyota 
Motor Sales and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing. There are 20 
separate corporations doing 
business in North America on 
behalf of Toyota. Although they 
report financially to Japan, they 
are operationally autonomous to 
the extent that they are respon-
sible for coordinating their 
activities with the parent 
company in Japan. That means 
we have 20 separate IT groups 
working within North America. 
We have 20 different manage-
ment processes in place, and 
therein lies both the opportu-
nity and the challenge to 
synchronize things while trying 
to work with the benefits of 
what these separate and talented 
organizations can do within 
their functional area. We 
produced 1.2 million vehicles in 
our North American plants last 
year, and over 60% of the vehi-
cles sold in the region are manu-
factured here. 
Toyota's global automotive 
operations can be classified in 
five areas. One is design. With 
respect to IT, design groups in 
Japan, North America, and 
Europe are charged with incor-
porating advanced IT technolo-
gies, including building in GPS 
(Global Positioning Systems), 
broader intelligent-highway 
functions, a n d commun ica t i on . 
Those are immediate demands 
from our customer base. 
Order-to-delivery lead time 
reduction is a joint initiative of 
manufacturing and marketing. 
Within Japan that means built 
to the customer's order, the way 
Dell builds for a specific end 
user; within North America , it 
is to a dealer's order that may 
or may not be linked to a 
specific customer order. At a 
Toyota dealer in Japan, a buyer 
chooses a specific model with 
specific features from a display 
terminal, the dealer pushes a 
button, and two weeks later the 
car is delivered. 
The company collects exten-
sive information on warranties 
and warranty claims that are used 
to make changes in production 
and design to ensure that prob-
lems are resolved. Other after-
sales activities include service 
support, manuals and documen-
tation, parts ordering, and 
customer service. These show 
high immediate returns from 
being made on-line processes. 
The process of unifying 
Toyota's independently devel-
oped administrative processes is 
currently underway. This is a 
major challenge. Once infra-
structure commonization is 
complete, uniform administra-
tive processes, including 
accounting and ERP (Enterprise 
Reporting Programs) systems 
can rest on them. 
The last piece of the IT 
picture is the addition of a 
management decision-making 
support system. Access Toyota is 
our customer-facing web site; it 
was developed by Toyota 
Canada. Toyota is committed to 
maintaining its relationships 
with its dealers, so while the 
web site provides pricing and 
other information, a purchase is 
done through a dealer. 
Breakthrough strategies are 
those that significantly reform 
business processes and represent 
new ways of operating. They 
often are possible only with 
enabling technology. Although 
not a function of IT, new strate-
gies may become apparent 
through the improved visibility 
offered by IT tools. 
Developed at Toyota 
Manufacturing in Canada and 
n o w being i m p l e m e n t e d at 
Toyota's plants worldwide, the 
ekanban process assigns a 
vehicle ID number several days 
before actual production starts. 
This enables bills of materials to 
be generated specifically for that 
vehicle rather than from projec-
tions of orders. Knowing precise 
vehicle requirements has 
permitted plants using the 
system to reduce on-site mate-
tials and component inventory 
by more than 30%. Extending 
the virtual-vehicle's life two days 
past line-off captures any addi-
tional parts and components 
that were pulled for the manu-
facturing process for that vehicle 
but not used. Any defects that 
caused the parts to be discarded 
are addressed by production 
engineering immediately and at 
that point. Defect-free compo-
nents previously lost to the 
production cycle are returned 
for reuse. 
Toyota constantly bench-
marks against Cisco, Dell, and a 
number of other nonautomotive 




systems (ITS) which include 
highway systems as well as 
systems embedded in the 
vehicle combine information, 
communications, and computer 
technologies to solve transporta-
tion problems. This includes IT 
that allows a vehicle to commu-
nicate with the cars a round it 
and with the highway infra-
structure. Globally, three major 
organizations are involved: ITS 
America, which is a publicpri-
vate partnership in the form of 
an advisory committee to the 
US Department of 
Transportation, Vertis, in Japan, 
and Vertigo, in Europe. 
Based on these organizations' 
activities, the relationship 
between the vehicle and the 
driver is changing. In the first 
stage of IT usage, the car 
provides information to the 
driver, monitoring such things 
as whether the driver is awake, 
as well as electronically paying 
tolls. The second stage is where 
the car supports the driving 
function, taking a more active 
role in how the car is managed. 
This includes collision-warning 
signals. Ultimately, there is colli-
sion avoidance, where the car 
actually brakes for the driver or 
even turns off the road to avoid 
an accident. The third step is 
where the automobile can drive 
itself. In Japan, the goal is to 
have, by 2012, a truly auto-
mated highway system where we 
will no longer be drivers, but 
supervisors. 
To ease traffic congestion, 
traffic and travel management 
systems are being deployed. 
These change traffic and ramp-
access lights and electronically 
collect payments. Singapore is a 
leader in such systems. Related 
to this are dynamic route guid-
ance systems that determine, on 
the basis of real-time traffic 
congestion, the best way to get 
somewhere. These are more 
than the computerized maps 
f o u n d in basic rou te nav iga t ion 
systems. Here Japan is ahead 
with 2 million dynamic-system 
vehicles compared to the US 
with about 100,000, or 
Germany with perhaps 50,000. 
DISCUSSION 
M a g i l a v y : The Toyota design 
group jokes that in five years 
you will pay $5 for the automo-
bile and the rest will be to 
download the software to run it. 
Whi te: Most automotive 
design is very integrated. 
because if you simply put 
modules together, the result may 
not run smoothly or have 
customer appeal. Rather, build-
toorder requires modularity. It 
also needs a coordinated supply 
chain, which means less vertical 
integration, which means 
stronger tier-one suppliers, and 
that is a concern to auto makers. 
My concern for Toyota is that 
because of its successful integra-
tion, it may be less able to tran-
sition to a modular approach 
than some others. But if Toyota 
already can deliver customized  
cars in a few days, this may not 
be a problem. 
M a g i l a v y : In Japan part of 
Toyota's website invites people 
to submit ideas for automobiles. 
The goal is to generate future 
models that appeal to younger 
Japanese, who are the most 
likely respondents to the site. 
This has led to a very strange 
looking car, called the Willy, 
which looks like the Citron 
Deucheveaux. In cooperation 
with o ther companies , the Willy 
brand has been expanded to a 
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Bruce Greenwald 
In economics, a competitive 
advantage for an incumbent 
firm is synonymous with a 
barrier to entry. There are a 
l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f such barr iers: 
proprietary technologies, captive 
customers, scale economies of 
some sort, and government 
protection. As a result, the effect 
of software, and webbased soft-
ware in particular, is to elimi-
nate barriers. The new economy 
and webbased efficiencies do not 
particularly create value for 
investors. To the extent they do, 
it is because competitors are less 
able to earn returns on the 
necessary investment, or there is 
a franchise, or protected market. 
Put differently, customers are 
the ultimate beneficiary of IT-
induced productivity growth as 
costs drop and are passed on to 
customers via competition. 
Something like this has 
happened before. In the late 
19th and early 20th century, 
retailing was largely a local 
monopoly. Then, in the 1920s 
the automobile gave alternatives 
to formerly captive customers. 
Even more than the auto, the 
internet allows easy price 
comparisons. 
The biggest impact of soft-
ware on Japanese industrial 
structure is that it is the 
supporter of competition, it is 
the enemy of profitability. 
People have to think about that 
extremely seriously. 
There are three things that 
seem to me important about 
adapting and using information 
technology in the quest for 
competitive advantage, and 
these apply to countries, sectors, 
and firms. First, it is a dynamic 
process: every day is, in a sense, 
a new paradigm, a new opportu-
nity. Second, IT must be 
pursued in an overall context. If 
pursued in isolation—buying 
PCs for everybody and the 
like—research suggests it is 
likely to be unsuccessful. Where 
a project is roofed in a funda-
mental reorganization oriented 
toward efficiency of the under-
lying processes, the returns can 
be enormous. Third, copying is 
good. Firms need to be willing 
to adapt innovations from 
companies used as benchmarks. 
The Sloan School looked at 
people's capacity to absorb 
information, and found it has 
been constant. But there is an 
increasing level of information 
production. The result is a 
traffic jam that, IT having 
helped create, IT must now 
help address. 
N e l s o n Fraiman 
Everything we have been 
talking about depends on the 
availability of data. But it takes a 
long time to have databases that 
are properly maintained and reli-
able. An example is that organi-
zations often have multiple data-
bases that do not talk to each 
other. If you make a travel reser-
vation on a web site, the data 
probably are different than if 
you telephoned the airline. 
Then there is the matter of 
what data to collect and how to 
use it. The RitzCarlton hotel 
chain tracks guests so, for 
example, if it knows you are 
allergic to feather pillows, it will 
put some other pillow on your 
bed regardless of which Ritz 
Carlton you stay in. 
The world is not really a 
single market because of local 
customs. In the US, Walmart 
restocks at night. In Brazil, labor 
laws do not allow that, and 
Walmart first tried to change the 
laws before adapting. 
Project execution is critical, 
and many firms are not very 
good at it. The head of opera-
tions of a major New York 
retailer told me about the store's 
system that predicts when a 
customer is going to run out of 
a cosmetic and alerts a sales 
associate to call the customer. 
On the way out, I stopped at 
the cosmetic counter and asked 
how the clerk was using the 
system. She was unaware of it. 
BCG and shop.org found 
tha t only 1.8% of visits to 
online retail sites result in a 
purchase. For specialty stores, 
the number is 40%. One reason 
is that customers are confused 
by complicated web sites, espe-
cially at checkout if you want to 
adjust an order in some way. 
Instead of looking at what wins 
orders in the marketplace, many 
sites are bringing in even more 
complex technology. I think 
that will simply lead to further 
alienation. 
When concern with quality 
became important, firms created 
VPs of quality. Successful firms 
eventually eliminated them 
because quality became an 
everyday activity. Now firms are 
creating VPs of ecommerce. 
Successful firms will be the ones 
who know how to link every-
thing together. I do not see 
many that are. 
When I taught a technology 
management course last year, I 
made it paperless. Not this year, 
because we found paperless was 
less efficient and more effort. A 
managed and strategic mix of 
systems and organization thus 
seems to work best. 
Peter Drysdale 
The researchers deliberately 
chose successful companies and 
examined their response to the 
IT revolution. But if you 
examine a larger sample, you 
might come to different con-
clusions about how firms have 
adapted, especially small and 
medium enterprises in the 
same industries as these large 
multinationals. The experi-
ences of unsuccessful firms also 
is relevant. 
I think useful interpretation 
of the role of IT means broader 
issues need to be taken into 
account. This includes specific 
condi t ions in the indust ry and 
in the national economy. 
As to Japan, in many ways I 
am rather pessimistic about 
overall performance. There is a 
real need for structural adjust-
ment. That said, in the next 5 
to 10 years, I can see Japan as a 
strong and vibrant economy 
with a high rate of productivity 
growth. Part of this will be 
because Japan has a good record 
of absorbing outside technolo-
gies, and that will extend to IT. 
DISCUSSION 
G r e e n w a l d : In 1980 Toyota 
was going to destroy everybody 
and rule the world. Well, it 
turns out the US auto compa-
nies coped with that. Going 
forward, some firms are going to 
be firstrate companies, and no 
firm will enjoy a particular 
competitive advantage. 
Those who think brand 
names are a competitive advan-
tage have to explain why the 
premier global brand for quality, 
probably Mercedes, earns 810% 
on capital at best, and that's 
pretax. Ford has earned over 
20% for the last ten years. 
Q : Is the biggest problem 
dealing with problems? 
Creenwald: There are 
companies that do that 
extremely well, and they do not 
do it with IT. The key is to see 
where IT is useful and where it 
is not useful. This means 
making the systems work 
together so that routine things 
are handled by IT, semiroutine 
things are handled by more 
sophisticated IT that never 
works the first time, and you 
have a default function which is 
an oldfashioned function that 
shrinks with time. 
Pat r ick: The ultimate back up 
is a human being. My wife finds 
catalogs the most efficient way 
to shop, but she hangs up if put 
on hold or the like, and goes 
someplace that says, "Yes ma'am, 
we're delighted to have you." 
Fraiman: She will find the 
cost of providing human service 
will force her to change her 
approach and learn to use the 
new technologies. 
Pat r i ck: To that she may say, 
"I prefer to pay the price of 
dealing with human beings 
where I get responses, because 
my time is valuable." 
Greenwald: On the opposite side, 
my 11-year old daughter hangs up 
when she gets a human. 
Drysdale: One of the 
striking and encouraging things 
about the global economic 
environment as it has emerged 
in the last 20 years is that the 
great global companies are no 
longer primarily US-based. And 
US firms are hiring more 
foreigners. There are great 
global corporations based in 
Japan and even Finland. 
F r a i m a n : And the greatest 
ones, in fact, don't see them-
selves as Japanese or as British or 
whatever 
Greenwald: There is a global 
business culture with a common 
language, English, and a 
common set of mathematical 
presentational forms. It seems 
there are not many fundamen-
tally different cultural things. 
However, there clearly are 
different structures of competi-
tion within different countries, 
and that has an important 
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